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ABSTRACT :  
The 2011 Japanese disaster often presented as a 
‘new Chernobyl’ accumulated the effects of 
earthquake, tsunami and of the subsequent nu-
clear accident at Fukushima. In the light of this 
disaster, we review methodological reasons 
both from geophysical and philosophical per-
spectives that lead the scientific and technologi-
cal communities to flawed conclusions, prime 
cause of the disaster. The origin of the scientific 
mistake lies in several factors that challenge a 
dominant paradigm of seismology: the shal-
lower part of the subduction was considered as 
weak, unable to produce large earthquakes; a 
complete breakage of the fault up to the sea-
floor was excluded. Actually, it appears that 
such complete rupture of the subduction inter-
face did characterize megathrust ruptures, but 
also that hazard evaluations and technical im-
plementation were in line with the flawed con-
sensual paradigm. We give a philosophical in-
terpretation to this mistake by weighing the op-
position between a prescriptive account and a 
descriptive account of the dynamics of research. 
We finally emphasize that imagination, bold-
ness, and openness (especially to alternatives to 
consensual paradigms) appear as core values 
for research. Those values may function as both 
epistemic and ethical standards and are so es-
sential as rigor and precision. Ability to doubt 
and to consider all uncertainties indeed appears 
essential when dealing with rare extreme natu-
ral hazards that may potentially be catastrophic.
KEYWORDS : 
earthquake, natural hazards, epistemology, 
paradigm, research methodology, intellectual 
virtues.
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1. Introduction
# Earthquakes are natural physical events 
with important human, societal and economic 
consequences. The destructive character of an 
earthquake depends primarily on geological and 
physical parameters, such as location, magni-
tude and geometry of fault rupture. Anthropo-
logical studies offer another perspective. 
Oliver-Smith (1994) claims that “disasters do 
not simply happen; they are caused”, adding 
that this is because “disasters occur at the inter-
face of society, technology, and environment 
and are the outcomes of the interactions of 
these features” (Oliver-Smith 1996). The main 
implication is that there is no disaster without a 
context of social-historical-political factors that 
will set up the vulnerability of human groups 
and settlements (Revet 2012). In the aftermath 
of the Lisbon catastrophe of 1755 -accumulat-
ing the effects of the earthquake, fire and tsu-
nami- the relative degree of responsibility of 
Nature and Humans was already subject of de-
bate between Voltaire (1756) and Rousseau 
(1756). Dynes (2000) suggests that the “first 
social scientific view on disaster”  – by Rous-
seau – clearly stated that the catastrophe was a 
social construction and that the urban pattern 
made a city located in a seismic risk area sus-
ceptible to damage. In our modern technocratic 
countries, the political or societal tasks de-
signed to anticipate effects of natural hazards 
deserve a variety of studies, debates and con-
troversies. In particular, the case of Nature ver-
sus Human responsibility is formalized by 
combining hazard with vulnerability to quanti-
tatively rate the risk and to settle mitigation so-
lutions. We note that several human and techni-
cal factors – including the way sensible infra-
structures are structurally engineered – may 
impact the vulnerability, but forecasting the 
hazard chiefly rests on the scientific expertise 
which may be affected by large unknowns. Ap-
proaches to take into account the range of sci-
entific ideas have been developed by the rein-
surance and catastrophe modeling industry to 
eventually reach a consensus (e.g., Delphi 
method, Linstone and Turoff 2002). In fact, so-
cial studies of science and technology (Callon 
et al. 2009) suggest that the process resulting in 
a dominant scientific perspective at a given 
moment – the paradigm on which the expertise 
is based – may adopt the form of a “social con-
struction”  (e.g., Tierney 2007). With these 
thoughts in mind, we note that the geophysical 
community rarely questions its ability to deliver 
a correct expertise to the rest of the society, nor 
evaluate related epistemic and ethical issues.
	
 After the 2011 Japanese magnitude 9 
earthquake and tsunami, and the ensuing nu-
clear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, 
an intense debate rose in the geophysical com-
munity (e.g., Avouac 2011, Geller 2011,  Kerr 
2011, Normile 2011, Sagiya et al. 2011, Stein 
and Okal 2011, Kanamori 2012, Lay 2012, 
Stein et al. 2012, Geller et al. 2015), perhaps 
summed up by breaking titles in Nature maga-
zine such as “Shake-up time for Japanese seis-
mology”  or “Rebuilding seismology”  (Geller 
2011, Sagiya et al. 2011). That debate revealed 
community's unease considering what seems to 
be a failure to have correctly evaluated the 
earthquake and tsunami hazards before disas-
ter's occurrence. In the light of the Japanese 
disaster, it appears crucial to re-evaluate theo-
retical and practical reasons and founding 
methodological principles, both from physical 
and philosophical points of view, that lead the 
scientific and technological communities to 
somewhat flawed conclusions and actions – or 
inaction – that should be considered as the 
prime cause of the disaster. We'll argue that it 
enlightens the processes leading scientific para-
digms to survive and eventually collapse, and 
the ways scientific models and their uncertain-
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ties are implemented – or not – by the technical 
and political spheres and understood by the rest 
of the society.
	
 We thus start with a review of the geo-
physical, technical and societal context to iden-
tify the different mistakes that lead to ravage of 
NE Japanese coastal settlements and to the Fu-
kushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. We then give 
a philosophical interpretation of those mistakes, 
before exploring implications in term of epis-
temic and ethical values and norms that should 
be kept in mind while forecasting extreme natu-
ral hazards. To ensure readability by a large, 
geophysical and anthropological community, 
we use footnotes to explain basic seismological 
and philosophical lexicon, processes and con-
cepts.
2. The geophysical,  technical and socie-
tal context
! The Mw  1  9.0 2011 Tōhoku-oki earth-
quake broke a ~500km long segment of the 
subduction megathrust 2 that marks the bound-
ary between the Pacific and Okhotsk tectonic 
plates (Figure 1, 2). The fault, which dips west 
beneath Japan, broke from depth ≥40km to its 
emergence at the sea floor. Coseismic slip 3 was 
particularly strong on the shallower parts of the 
fault close to the Japan trench (several tens of 
meters, possibly more than 50m, see Figure 2c), 
causing large vertical displacements of the sea-
bottom just above the fault and provoking huge 
tsunami waves (e.g., Lay et al. 2011, Simons et 
al. 2011, Ozawa et al. 2011, Kodaira et al. 2012, 
Satake et al. 2013, Tajima et al. 2013). On the 
coast facing the Japan trench, tsunami inunda-
tion reached heights typically larger that 15m, 
locally 30-40m, above average sea level (Mori 
et al. 2011), killing more than 15000, drowning 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant (Figure 3) 
and provoking the subsequent nuclear accident. 
In the past sixty years before that event, at least 
four Mw9+ earthquakes  – Kamtchatka 1952 
Mw   9, Chile 1960 Mw   9.5, Alaska 1964 
Mw 9.2, Sumatra 2004 Mw 9.1 to 9.3, and pos-
sibly Aleutians 1957 Mw 8.6 to 9.1 4  – broke 
various subduction megathrust segments 
worldwide (Figure  1, see also Figure  4). As a 
consequence, the risk of occurrence of such 
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1	
  The moment magnitude, noted Mw, is a physical measure of the energy released by the earthquake. 
Its scale is logarithmic, not linear. A Mw 7 event has 30 times the energy of a Mw 6 (the same relation exists 
between Mw 8 and 7 or Mw 9 and 8 for example). Here we note Mw9+ for earthquakes with magnitudes ≥9. 
2	
  Subduction megathrusts are extremely large geological faults marking the interface of converging 
tectonic plates. They dip relatively gently (~10-30°) below the upper plate (Japan in our case) while the 
lower plate (here the Pacific plate) is sliding downward at a pluri-centimetric rate. The upper part of the 
megathrust, from depth ~40km to its emergence at the oceanic trench, moves in a stick-slip way on century 
time-scale, a process called the seismic cycle. Between large earthquakes, the fault stays locked, and, on each 
side, upper and lower plates deform and store plate convergence in an elastic (reversible) way. Stresses thus 
accumulate and eventually reach a yield point generating a massive seismic slip on the fault - itself causing 
the earthquake - releasing part or totality of the stored elastic strain. Those processes - strain accumulation 
and catastrophic release - are now accurately measured by geodesy using GPS or other techniques.
3 	
 The "coseismic slip" represents the amount of slip on the fault that accumulated quasi-
instantaneously (tens of seconds to minutes) during the earthquake. That slip generates destructive seismic 
waves and vertical motion of the sea floor responsible for the tsunami.
4	
  Magnitude of the 1957 Aleutian earthquake vary significantly from one study to another.
Mw9+ events on any subduction zone in the 
World was correctly identified by few authors 
(e.g., McCaffrey 2008), although dismissed or 
ignored by most of the geophysical community. 
Indeed, the scientific consensus before Tōhoku 
was that each subduction zone has its own, 
complex, segmentation and mechanical proper-
ties  5 , and that many subduction zones in the 
World will never produce a Mw9+. This was 
admitted for the part of the Japan trench that 
eventually broke in 2011, where erroneous es-
timates of potential magnitudes and rupture 
segmentation resulted in bottom level estimates 
of the hazards (e.g., Fujiwara et al. 2006, Fuji-
wara & Morikawa 2012). But, as noted a poste-
riori by Stein and Okal (2011), “the size of the 
2011 Tōhoku earthquake need not have been a 
surprise”. We identify several interwoven 
causes to what should be considered as a scien-
tific mistake.
	
 Hazard estimates were only based on 
the detailed analytical record of local past 
events, which were considered over a too short 
period of time. The Mw~7.5 earthquakes of the 
past decades were taken as characteristic of the 
seismic potential of the subduction offshore 
Tōhoku. A model of segmented, patchy subduc-
tion interface was thus deduced (Figure 2a) and 
used for earthquake and tsunami hazard calcu-
lations with the aim to produce the official haz-
ard maps (Fujiwara et al. 2006, Yanagisawa et 
al. 2007, Fujiwara & Morikawa 2012). It ap-
pears that the 2011 event largely overcame that 
segmentation (Figure 2c). It is worth noting that 
those hazard estimates based on the short-term 
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5	
  The magnitude of an earthquake depends on the size of the broken fault or fault segment, and on the 
coseismic slip. In addition these two parameters are linked by scale-laws. This implies that a small fault, or a 
very segmented fault will thus be unable to generate large earthquakes.
Figure 1 : Large magnitude (Mw≥8.5) earthquakes at the origin of important tsunamis since 1900 (Mw 9+ larger 
dots, Mw 8.5-9 smaller dots). When known with an acceptable precision, the along-strike extension of coseismic 
ruptures are sketched by bold lines. Main fault traces are in white, names of main tectonic plates are in white 
italicized characters.
local analytical record were not put in perspec-
tive of the worldwide memory of giant 
megathrust events. Specifically, close to the N 
in Kamtchatka, the same subduction interface 
than in NE Japan hosted a very large magnitude 
(Mw~9) earthquake in 1952 (Figure  1). The 
fault segment facing the Tōhoku coast has the 
same first-order geometrical characters than the 
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Figure 2 : Context and reality of the 2011 Tōhoku-oki earthquake. Upper left map (a) illustrates views prior to the 
2011 event about characteristic seismicity and segmentation of the subduction interface offshore NE Japan. The 
past earthquake rupture zones since 1895 (of moderate-large magnitudes) are shown by dotted lines (after Tajima 
et al. 2013, based on Kanamori et al. 2006). The segmentation on which former hazard map calculations were 
based (Fujiwara et al. 2006, Yanagisawa et al. 2007, Fujiwara and Morikawa 2012) is shown in black. The maxi-
mum magnitudes considered for segments indicated by circled numbers 1 to 8 are : [1]  Mw~8, [2]  Mw?, 
[3] Mw7.5, [4] Mw7.7, [5] Mw7.4, [6] Mw6.7-7.2, [7] Mw?, [8] Mw8.2 (Fujiwara and Morikawa 2012). Upper 
right map (b) illustrates the 2011 Mw9 earthquake rupture. Several lines (in different colors in online version of 
the article) show the extension of the rupture zone as estimated by different source models (zones with coseismic 
slip ~≥5m; Lay et al. 2011, Ozawa et al. 2011, Simmons et al. 2011, Yue and Lay 2011, Yagi and Fukahata 2011, 
Hashimoto et al. 2012, Satake et al. 2013). Star locates main shock epicenter while open small dots are aftershock 
epicenters. Map on (c) shows a comparison of the previously admitted segmentation with the reality of the 2011 
earthquake: the rough extension of the Mw9 rupture is sketched by light shading from (b)  and the zone with very 
large slip (~ ≥20m) is shown by darker shading (from same source models). Both clearly overprint segmentation 
shown in black. On the three subset figures, black dots show nuclear sites with Onagawa and Fukushima daichi 
ones clearly identified.
one that broke in 1952 offshore Kamtchatka. 
This should have hint for the potential of earth-
quakes with much larger rupture zones and 
magnitudes along the Japan trench  6 . Indeed, 
the millenary historical record implies that very 
large events broke the subduction offshore NE 
Japan in the past. The largest of these events 
appears to be the 869AD Jōgan earthquake that 
gave rise to a tsunami with effects comparable 
to those of the 2011 Tōhoku-oki event (e.g., 
Sugawara et al., 2012a, 2012b). Other strong 
tsunami hit the NE Japan coast in the past cen-
turies (e.g. 1611, 1793, 1896, 1933). Perhaps 
also akin to 2011's, the 1611AD Keicho earth-
quake and tsunami, known from historical and 
geological records, inundated many places 
along the Japan coast embracing the Sendai 
plain (e.g. Minoura et al. 2013). All those 
events – apparently too old to be considered – 
were not taken into account for hazard calcula-
tions, even after documenting the geological 
traces of huge tsunami inundations that oc-
curred in the past with return times of ~1000 
years (see for example Minoura et al. 2001; 
Sawai et al. 2007). 
	
 There was a wide consensus in the geo-
physical community on a paradigmatic physical 
model of along-dip segmentation of frictional 
properties and asperities on the subduction in-
terface (e.g., Kanamori 1986, Byrne et al. 1988, 
Hyndman et al. 1997, see recent discussion by 
Lay et al. 2012 and Hubbard et al. 2014). The 
shallower part of the subduction megathrust 
was considered as weak and mostly aseismic, 
thus unable to produce large earthquakes or 
only prone to perhaps slip alone during slow 
“tsunami earthquakes”. A complete breakage of 
the fault from depth ≥30-40km to its emergence 
at the trench sea-floor was excluded (while that 
sort of behavior is now accepted and docu-
mented for large active faults inland, see Hub-
bard et al. 2014 and Figure 4). But actually, it 
appears that such complete rupture of the sub-
duction interface did characterize the 
megathrust ruptures that happened during the 
past-decade (Sumatra 2004, Chile 2010, Japan 
2011, see for example Vigny et al. 2011, Lay et 
al. 2012, Hubbard et al. 2014). This was likely 
the case too for the Mw9+ earthquakes from the 
1950s and 1960s (Figure 4) although the geo-
physical observations acquired at earthquakes's 
time are barely sufficient to confirm that infer-
ence. Yet, as already mentioned, each subduc-
tion zone in the world was considered to have 
its own, complex mechanical properties, and 
many subduction segments were thought to 
never produce very large ruptures (e.g., Ka-
namori 1986). The idea of a patchy subduction 
interface offshore Tōhoku –  on which hazard 
estimates were based (see above) – was in line 
with this consensual model. The short term 
seismic record – earthquakes of moderate mag-
nitude – was taken as characteristic of the mode 
of rupture of complex fault segments and as-
perities (Figure   2a), and the interface was 
viewed as poorly seismically coupled (i.e., little 
strain released by earthquakes compared to 
what is expected to occur from plate conver-
gence rate; e.g., Yamanaka & Kikuchi 2004). In 
contrast, modeling of the GPS measurements 
acquired in the past 15 years (Mazotti et al. 
2000, Nishimura et al. 2004, Suwa et al. 2006, 
Hashimoto et al. 2009, Loveless and Meade 
2010) suggested that a large part of the 
megathrust was indeed locked and efficiently 
storing plate convergence as elastic strain be-
fore its complete breakage in 2011. That this 
elastic strain was ready to be released by a fu-
ture great earthquake was not clearly pointed 
out however – at best it was stated as one 
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6	
  The same subduction zone also caused large M8+ earthquakes in 1963 and 2006 offshore the Kuril 
islands (Mw 8.5 and 8.3).
among several possible interpretations (e.g., 
Kanamori et al. 2006) – neither taken into ac-
count to reassess hazard evaluations. 
	
 There was an excess of confidence in 
sophisticated numerical models in line with the 
consensus described above, and in the sound-
ness of the modeling results, as illustrated by 
the following example. In the past decade, geo-
logical studies of tsunami sand deposits in the 
Sendai bay tried to document the inundation 
distances and heights reached by the 869AD 
Jōgan tsunami (Minoura et al. 2001, Sawai et 
al. 2007). Then, numerical modeling of the 
869AD earthquake was done to calculate pre-
dicted inland inundations and to compare these 
predicted values to the results of the geological 
investigations. From those comparisons, several 
possible magnitudes were considered for that 
medieval event depending on the size and loca-
tion of the modeled earthquake source. A 
maximum magnitude of Mw~8.3 was eventu-
ally retained corresponding to the rupture of a 
fault segment slightly larger than the patch la-
belled 4 on Figure 2a (Minoura et al. 2001, Sa-
take et al. 2008). Field observations acquired 
after the 2011 tsunami showed that the inunda-
tion reached roughly the same level in 2011 
than in 869AD (Goto et al. 2011, Sugawara et 
al. 2012a, 2012b). This suggests that the previ-
ous modeling underestimated the size of the 
Jōgan earthquake source and thus the magni-
tude of the medieval earthquake, probably be-
cause it was dimensioned in conformity with 
the consensual idea of along-dip segmentation 
of the subduction, and because all uncertainties 
were not properly taken into account (see Goto 
et al. 2011). Yet, although the modeled magni-
tude for the 869AD earthquake (Mw~8.3) was 
much larger than the one (~7.5) kept to estab-
lish the official hazard maps, it has not been 
taken into account to reevaluate those maps. It 
is also interesting to note that another class of 
sophisticated models was used for probabilistic 
calculations aiming to produce those hazard 
estimates and maps (e.g., Fujiwara et al. 2006, 
Annaka et al. 2007, Yanagisawa et al. 2007, Fu-
jiwara & Morikawa 2012). But it appears that 
those models were also scaled with respect to 
the flawed consensus mentioned above (see 
Stein and Geller 2012), thus actually unable to 
give correct evaluations of the true hazards. 
	
 The technical, industrial and political 
spheres implemented protection measures in 
line with the scientific consensus and compati-
ble with their economic interests (see for exam-
ple Nöggerath et al. 2011, Funabashi 2012, 
Funabashi & Kitazawa 2012). At the TEPCO 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, the protection 
against tsunami was set up at plant's conception 
time (in the 1960-70s) from the height meas-
ured locally after the 1960 tsunami. However, 
that tsunami was due to a source on the oppo-
site side of the Pacific Ocean (a massive 
Mw  9.5 earthquake that broke the subduction 
megathrust along the Chilean coast). Surpris-
ingly, largest tsunamis due to past earthquakes 
with sources much closer than the Chilean sub-
duction were not considered, although well 
known from historical evidence. Until now, 
even after some warnings issued by few scien-
tists in the past decade (Nöggerath et al. 2011, 
Hasegawa 2012), these evidence were down-
played by most engineers (see Krolicki et al. 
2011, Nöggerath et al. 2011, Aoki & Rothwell 
2013) and even by seismologists (see Stein et 
al. 2012). Tsunami protection at Fukushima 
Daiichi was thus never significantly reevalu-
ated. It remained dimensioned for run-up 
heights ≤ 5.7m (Nöggerath et al. 2011, IRSN 
2012) while the 2011 tsunami reached ~14-15m 
at plant's site (Figure 3; IRSN 2012). In fact, 
likely to reduce technical issues and costs re-
lated to cold water supply, the Fukushima Daii-
chi plant was built close to sea level (≤10m ele-
vation, IRSN 2012) on a platform artificially 
carved across the coastal escarpment limiting a 
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small plateau at 30-40m above sea level (Figure 
3). Clearly, most of destructions and troubles 
due to the tsunami would have been definitively 
avoided setting the plant on top of the coastal 
plateau. It's worth noting that the Onagawa nu-
clear plant – operated by another company and 
set even closer to the 2011 earthquake epicenter 
(Figure 2) – was saved due to past personal de-
termination of an engineer, Y. Hirai. At the end 
of the 1960s, Hirai fought to set Onagawa plant 
protection at ~15m with respect to what he 
knew about the 869AD tsunami (Reb et al. 
2012, Yamada 2012). The 2011 tsunami 
reached ~13m at Onagawa, slightly less than 
the height of the wall. Thus, some warnings to 
the technical sphere, vain in the case of Fu-
kushima Daiichi, were issued by few whistle-
blowers. However, a large part of the geophysi-
cal community remained tied to a paradigm (see 
above) and did not delivered unflawed models 
with a full discussion of unknowns and uncer-
tainties (Stein et al. 2012). This certainly hin-
dered any serious reevaluation of hazard as-
sessment and of protection measures. The exis-
tence of a nuclear “myth of safety”  (Funabashi 
2012, Geller et al. 2013), anchored in the long-
standing development of the Japanese “nuclear 
village”  since the 1960s 7  and correlative con-
flicts of interest (Nakamura & Kikuchi 2011, 
Onishi 2011c, Funabashi 2012, Funabashi & 
Kitazawa 2012, Hasegawa 2012, Reb et al. 
2012), did the rest. After the disaster, the bad 
technocratic and political responses in the days 
and weeks that followed the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident worsened its direct consequences and 
societal impact (e.g., Onishi 2011b, Funabashi 
& Kitazawa 2012, The National Diet of Japan 
2012, Reb et al. 2012, Aoki & Rothwell 2013, 
Hindmarsh 2013).
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7	
  "Nuclear village" is the term used to describe the Japanese community of politicians, bureaucrats, 
engineers, business people and academics, involved in the development of the nuclear energy, and that de-
veloped a culture of being closed to outsiders, lacking mutual criticism and becoming overconfident about 
safety (see for example Nakamura & Kikuchi 2011, Reb et al. 2012, Kingston 2012).
Figure 3 : Setting of the Fukushima Daiichi nu-
clear plant and 2011 tsunami inundation (based 
on Google Earth 3D view; background image is 
a satellite view taken on march 12th 2011, only 
one day after the tsunami). The plant is built on a 
small platform at less than 10m above sea level 
(asl), That platform has been carved across the 
escarpment limiting a small plateau at >30m asl 
(30m elevation curve redrawn from japanese 
topographic maps). Arrows on (a) point to trace 
of maximum tsunami run-up clearly visible on 
the satellite view. On (b) a flat plane at 14m asl 
(in blue in online version of the article)  has been 
added to simulate tsunami inundation. Its inter-
section with the topographic model provided by 
Google Earth fits remarkably well the maximum 
run-up trace identified on (a).
	
 Last, the society, confident in the scien-
tific expertise and in the implemented technical 
protection measures, downplayed the ancestral 
memory of past-events. Along the Japan coast, 
huge concrete walls and breakwaters were built 
to protect coastal communities from tsunamis. 
In many places, those protections were over-
topped and largely destroyed by the 2011 
waves, and a debate then initiated on the way to 
design more efficient protections (Cyranoski 
2012, Normile 2012, Stein & Stein 2012, 
McNeill & McCurry 2014). So far, it appeared 
that the existence of the walls set a false sense 
of security, leading people to stay in their house 
because they thought the wall would protect 
them (McNeill & McCurry 2014). According to 
some reports, the presence of the walls even 
prompted people to rush toward them after the 
earthquake – thus towards the sea – sadly to be 
swept away by the tsunami (Onishi 2011a). 
Noteworthy, Japan coast was dotted by hun-
dreds of so-called tsunami stones, centuries old 
monuments indicating higher reaches of past 
inundations and carved with inscriptions telling 
people to seek higher grounds after a strong 
earthquake (Fackler 2011). At the village of 
Aneyoshi the stone even stated to avoid build-
ing below it (Fackler 2011, Pons 2011). Except 
in few rural places like Aneyoshi, where every-
body eventually survived, modern Japan people 
ignored those ancestral warnings likely because 
they were too confident in advanced techno-
logical protection (Fackler 2011, Pons 2011). 
We note that maintaining live memory is now 
clearly identified as a challenge for the future 
(Cyranoski 2012, Shibata 2012).
3. A philosophical perspective on the 
methodology of research 
! The preceding review of the 
geophysical-technical-societal context shows 
that it is crucial to correctly assess the seismic 
hazard and risk but also the methodological 
foundations on which this assessment is based. 
The science of earthquakes, seismology, at-
tempts to explain and forecast these events with 
more or less accuracy, depending on the spatial 
and temporal scale considered. The major disas-
ter in Fukushima, a new “Chernobyl”  caused by 
the 2011 magnitude 9 earthquake, is often pre-
sented as a result of human error, from the ini-
tial choice of the location of nuclear sites to the 
management of the nuclear crisis by the 
authorities. At the regional level, the number of 
victims and the extent of damage due to the 
tsunami appear almost abnormal for the country 
which seemed a priori the world better pre-
pared to cope with such disasters. It became 
customary to reduce the earthquake to its hu-
man consequences, both as environmental and 
social health, while it can be very enlightening 
to examine the physical causes. It is very in-
formative, especially, to put into perspective the 
discourse of the international scientific commu-
nity, anterior and posterior to the disaster, the 
competing hypotheses and their corresponding 
models. 
Then it is a quite different landscape of 
the disaster that appears, in which the seismol-
ogical science also bears some responsibility. 
Its failing to achieve correct explanations and 
predictions equals indeed disqualifying some of 
its far dominant models. The Tōhoku-oki earth-
quake and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi 
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nuclear accident raise some methodological 
problems that are rather classical in the phi-
losophy of science. They can be suggestively 
presented by recalling the cornerstone opposi-
tion in philosophy between Popper and Kuhn 
on the dynamics of research8. It is then possible 
to give a methodological interpretation to this 
serious mistake by weighing the opposition be-
tween on the one hand a “prescriptive”  logical-
critical approach and on the other hand a “de-
scriptive” pragmatic approach.
	
 Karl Popper in his Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (Popper, 2002a; first published in 
1934) provides a logical account of the dynam-
ics of research through a critical method of trial, 
test and error. From a methodological point of 
view, this “logical negativism”  based on falsifi-
cation can be distinguished from a “logical 
positivism”  based on verification. Popper states 
that no researcher can prove with certainty that 
one theory is true, but at least, he can prove 
with certainty that the theory is false - or at 
least provisionally non-false. The reason lies in 
the asymmetry between the true and the false, 
since the theory’s statements must be true in all 
cases, while only one statement showing con-
tradiction in one case is enough to make it false. 
If you say, for instance, that “There can be no 
mega-thrust earthquake in subduction zones”, 
this theory can be shown false if you are able to 
exhibit only one exception to the rule, like 
“There has been one mega-thrust earthquake in 
one subduction zone”. The logical criterion of 
science in Popper’s is a negative one: it is not 
the possibility of confirmation, but the possibil-
ity of refutation of a theory (refutability) 
through a set of severe tests. A theory as a con-
jecture can be said “valid”  or “corroborated” 
(but not “true”  stricto sensu) once it has passed 
successfully (but maybe provisionally) the 
various observational or experimental tests 
aimed at showing that it is false. In this respect, 
the dynamics of research is basically that of a 
process of conjectures and refutations (Popper, 
2002b; first published in 1963) in a context of 
radical uncertainty as to the truth of a theory. It 
is characterized by a collective stance of “per-
manent critique”  that avoids the community 
members to rely satisfyingly on the current 
state of knowledge. This view essential to the 
stream of Critical Rationalism suggests that 
research is a demanding and daring task of in-
tellectual subversion and is (or should be) al-
ways more or less in a state of “revolution” 
(Bouveresse, 1987; Miller, 1994). The evolu-
tionary view on research and the rejection of 
certainty are correct, but this methodology faces 
some limits. First, the negative account based 
on refutation does not describe adequately the 
effective work of the researchers who do not 
seek only to prove things to be false. Second, it 
overestimates the rationality of research as 
grounded on the open and free discussion and 
the use of convincing arguments by the com-
munity members. Third, it underestimates the 
importance of the research framework that 
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 These conflicting approaches remain topical for most contemporary methodological debates, even if 
one could also refer to some other parallel approaches located so to speak in between the two of them (for 
instance, Lakatos’ research programs for Popper, or Hacking’s styles of reasoning  for Kuhn).  However, one 
has to keep in mind some recent interpretations that temper the supposedly radical differences between Pop-
per and Kuhn, especially on the rationality of criteria for choosing among two competing theories (see Fuller, 
2004; Soler, 2007). 
bounds the range of relevant and legitimate op-
tions to be examined.
	
 Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions (Kuhn, 2012; first published in 
1962) provides a challenging pragmatic view to 
Popper’s methodology by stressing also the 
“non-logical”  (sociological, psychological) as-
pects of the research dynamics. This pragmatic 
approach underlines the importance of para-
digms as research frameworks that structure the 
work of “puzzle-solving”  achieved by the 
members of one research community. A para-
digm (from the Greek paradeigma, example, 
model) is a theoretical, technical and practical 
framework that functions as a disciplinary ma-
trix for the “normal science” - to be distin-
guished from the “revolutionary science” 9. In 
other words, the research led by a community 
of researchers in one academic speciality de-
velops within a framework that indicates which 
puzzles and how the puzzles should be exam-
ined and eventually solved. In Kuhn’s, the dy-
namics of research is a process of normal sci-
ence in which the researchers dedicate their ef-
forts to solve some ordinary puzzles. In prac-
tice, “normal”  research activity builds a corpus 
of evidence while performing tests aiming to 
confirm the consensual ideas.  But this process 
can evolve toward a state of revolutionary sci-
ence if it happens indeed that some researchers 
identify a set of theoretical or empirical anoma-
lies that questions the validity of the models. 
These anomalies are usually denied or rejected 
at the beginning by the majority of the commu-
nity members who take dissonant phenomena to 
be some kind of meaningless abnormalities 
with no impact on the dominant model10. For 
instance, this is the case if, within a community 
of researchers believing that “There can be no 
mega-thrust earthquake in subduction zones”, 
you pretend that “There has been one mega-
thrust earthquake in one subduction zone”, but 
this point is not interpreted as model-
challenging. Nevertheless, the growing impor-
tance of those anomalies can lead to a paradigm 
crisis and eventually to a paradigm shift if it 
appears that the current framework sustainably 
fails to give satisfying explanations or interpre-
tations of them. Then, the normal science turns 
into a period of revolutionary science in which 
the researchers dedicate their efforts to design-
ing a new paradigm - that will be the frame-
work for a new period of normal science…This 
cycle of research provides seemingly a correct 
and relevant account of how researchers actu-
ally functions within a scientific community. 
But this view also faces some limits: first, the 
rationality of research is threatened by the na-
ture of the changing factors which are less a 
matter of discussion or argumentation than a 
matter of sudden disclosure for the community 
members; second, the paradigms as conflicting 
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  In his “second thoughts”  on paradigms, Kuhn suggested to re-define a paradigm, on the ground that 
its variety of uses could be confusing, as a “disciplinary matrix”: “less confusion will result if I instead re-
place it with the phrase "disciplinary matrix"--"disciplinary" because it is the common possession of the 
practitioners of a professional discipline and "matrix" because it is composed of ordered elements of various 
sorts, each requiring further specification”, in Kuhn, 1977.
10	
  Alternative hypotheses of some of the members of the scientific community are held in the best case 
for some deviant fantasies and in the worst case for some malpractices.
“world versions”  are not commensurable (the 
famous Incommensurability Thesis) and in that 
sense cannot be compared one another 11; third, 
the weight of the community discipline can in-
flict a majority viewpoint or conformism that 
prevents some members from examining some 
deviant options and from developing an original 
creative research.  
	
 It seems that on a descriptive basis, the 
dynamics of research as conceived of by Kuhn 
is the most relevant to the case of Tōhoku-oki 
earthquake as it emphasizes the key-role of 
paradigms. It is now clear that the error made 
by the researchers (and not only by the engi-
neers who built the nuclear plants) concerning 
the Tōhoku-oki earthquake had some fierce 
consequences on the shores of Fukushima. The 
dominant paradigm entailed a series of errors, 
all tracing back to the following postulate: it is 
impossible for giant thrust earthquakes to occur 
in some parts of the world including many sub-
duction zones, like that facing Fukushima. 
Many analytical data and sophisticated physical 
models came to support this dominant para-
digm. On several occasions, scientists tried to 
propose an alternative design, including the 
possibility of giant thrust earthquakes in these 
prohibited areas. But this was seen as a deviant 
solution without any validity and legitimacy, 
and in that respect, the inertia of the paradigm 
shows the relevance of Kuhn’s view. 
Our hypothesis is that the mistake of the 
researchers can be illuminated by the paradig-
matic focus on the analytical (or “atomistic”) 
approach to the problem to the detriment of the 
synthetic (or “holistic”) approach. Thus, the 
methodological tropism led to a kind of “ana-
lytical drift”  of research polarized by the resolu-
tion of questions of detail. More precisely, this 
methodological bias concerned the local short-
term record of relatively moderate earthquakes 
as a clue for the mechanics of the subduction 
mega-thrust and related hazards. This methodo-
logical tropism led to a subsequent denial of a 
more “synthetic vision”  which, however, would 
have given a clearly different and more relevant 
meaning to the empirical data. The analysis of 
seismological articles from one or two decades 
shows the difficulty to formalize, or verbalize, 
questioning the established model, even in the 
presence of data showing clearly the opposite. 
The only difference from Kuhn’s classical ac-
count as far as Tōhoku-oki earthquake is con-
cerned lies in the nature of the consequences of 
explanations and predictions: a mere intellec-
tual mistake in most cases, a large-scale human 
disaster in the case of Fukushima. The connec-
tion between one theoretical model and its prac-
tical consequences was already examined by 
Kuhn, but through the lens of applied science, 
not that of a human catastrophe. The catastro-
phe of Fukushima was sufficiently devastating 
to enforce the community of seismologists to 
achieve a paradigm shift, or at least to accept 
the crisis of the dominant model: this reveals (if 
need be) the power of paradigms in the framing 
of scientific thought12. One can reasonably 
wonder if, beyond the elementary rule of pre-
caution, a philosophy of research more inspired 
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  Even if Kuhn finally assumed that the incommensurability of paradigms is relative and that transla-
tion from one theory to another is closer to “learning of a new language”  than to “living in another world”: 
“If I were now rewriting The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, I would emphasize language change more 
and the normal / revolutionary distinction less”, in “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, 
Kuhn, in Conant and Haugeland (2000) p. 57. 
12	
  In that sense, the dominant seismological paradigm turned out to be a catastrophic one - all the more 
that, if one refers to the Greek etymology, “catastrophe”  designates the “outcome”  or the “conclusion”  in a 
drama.
by Popper’s appeal to the bold open mind of the 
researchers as required by the “critical method” 
could not prevent this kind of catastrophe… 
But this requires shifting from a descriptive to a 
prescriptive basis and as far as the dynamics of 
research is concerned, paying attention not only 
to the way research actually functions, but to 
the way it should function.
	
 The role of the “catastrophic paradigm”  
in the Fukushima accident can be made more 
explicit by examining the methodological prob-
lem of causality that is at the core of the scien-
tific mistake. This methodological problem of 
explanation can be examined by considering the 
difference between a deductive-nomological 
model based on laws and an inductive-
statistical model based on cases (Hempel, 
1962). In the formal reasoning, the explanation 
takes the form of an inductive or deductive ar-
gument, where the premises are called the “ex-
planans” and the conclusion the “explanan-
dum” 13. 
 In Hempel’s “deductive-nomological” 
(D-N) model, the explanations make the occur-
rence of singular events intelligible by deriving 
their descriptions from premises that include at 
least one law:  
Premises:
L1, L2, … Lk
C1, C2, … Cr
Conclusion:        E
where the explanans C1, C2, …, Cr describe 
specific conditions (“initial” or “antecedent”) 
and L1, L2, …, Lk general laws, and the ex-
planandum “E” describes the event to be ex-
plained. 
In statistical explanations defined as 
“inductive-statistical” (I-S), a certain probabil-
ity  is attributed to the explanandum G (the 
event):
P(G,F) = r
F
G
where the law P(G,F) = r states that the prob-
ability of an event G, given the conditions F 
(i.e. a set of observations), is r.
The methodological interpretation of the 
Tōhoku-Fukushima case suggests that the 
dominant paradigm among the research com-
munity was based on a kind of reasoning that 
belongs to the Inductive-Statistical model (I-S). 
It happened indeed that the set of data collected 
from the subduction zones and used for hazard 
calculations gave no statistical support to the 
possibility - as expressed by a non-null prob-
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  One can recall briefly that an induction is a non demonstrative inference from a set of particular 
cases to a general rule.  For instance, for a set of particular cases: “I drop Stone 1, and it falls down”; “I drop 
Stone 2, and it falls down”, and so on; hence the general rule: “If I drop a Stone X, it falls down”. Con-
versely, a deduction  is a demonstrative inference from a general rule to a set of particular cases, like in the 
following premise that functions as a basis for the reasoning: “If I drop any Stone X, it falls down”. In terms 
of argument, if the author of the argument believes that the truth of the premises definitely establishes the 
truth of the conclusion, then the argument is deductive. If the author of the argument does not believe that the 
truth of the premises definitely establishes the truth of the conclusion (but believes that their truth provides 
good reason to believe the conclusion true), then the argument is inductive. However, one can mention as far 
as hypothetical-deductive reasoning is concerned that a general rule can be used as explanation of particular 
cases and that a set of particular cases can be used as a test for the general rule. Thus, the general rule can be 
examined in the light of some various experimental cases, such as: “If I drop a stone on Earth, it falls down”, 
but “If I drop a stone inside a space shuttle out of the Earth, it does not fall down”  (for an overview of the 
induction/deduction problem, see Rothchild (2006) and Lawson (2005)). 
ability (P) - of mega-thrust earthquakes in the 
area facing Fukushima (G). The problem is that 
the conditions (F) for the probability of an 
earthquake of this kind to occur were not cor-
rect, for the space-time coordinates and thus the 
dataset, were too limited. But as seen before, 
their too narrow scope was due to the analytical 
tropism of the seismological research that made 
it unthinkable, so to speak, to aggregate the data 
in order to get a broader (global rather than lo-
cal) and deeper (longer term seismic record) 
insight on the overall seismic activity. Moreo-
ver, it might be that another shortcoming con-
sisted in taking the statistical rule for granted, 
as a grounding premise shared by the majority 
of researchers in a common reasoning that was 
actually closer to the Deductive-Monological 
model (D-N). Indeed, it appears that the para-
digmatic model of a “segmented patchy sub-
duction interface unable to break as a whole” 
justified the choice of a narrow set of data by a 
sort of retroaction. The interpretation thus sug-
gests the following: (1) The methodological 
model of causality (probabilistic versus deter-
ministic) was data-dependent; (2) but the selec-
tion of the data itself was frame-dependent 
(paradigmatic). To illustrate this, let's recall that 
the seismic hazard maps for Japan by Head-
quarters for Earthquake Research Promotion 
(HERP 2005, Fujiwara et al. 2006) were calcu-
lated using a relatively standard probabilistic 
seismic hazard analysis (PSHA)14. This analysis 
was based on a quite short-term earthquake 
catalog – thus data-dependent – and a patchy 
earthquake source model compatible with the 
consensual view of subduction earthquake me-
chanics – thus frame-dependent.
 To be complete however, we must ac-
knowledge the complexity  of the physics of 
faulting, making earthquakes non linear, largely 
unpredictable processes. It  is now clear that 
megathrust earthquakes do not repeat in a 
strictly regular way on a given subduction fault. 
This means that  concepts like those of charac-
teristic earthquake or seismic gap should be 
used with caution or are perhaps even meaning-
less (e.g. Kagan and Geller, 2012; Geller et al. 
2015). We  may try  to formalize this observa-
tion as follows :
Lnormal Lnormal + Lcatastrophic
C1, C2, … 
Cr
or C1, C2, … Cr
Enormal Ecatastrophic
The normal case (Enormal) would explain the 
usual - but not so regular - repetition of 
moderately-large earthquakes (with average 
repeat times of several decades to century  in 
Japan) and would fit  quite well the established 
subduction earthquake paradigm. But, as these 
“normal” earthquakes do not relax all accumu-
lated stresses, we hypothesize that the system 
needs very unfrequent catastrophic event (Ecatas-
trophic) to return close to a zero state (potentially 
every  thousand years or so in Japan). Such a 
mechanism may recall the concept of supercy-
cles and superquakes proposed by  some authors 
(Sieh et  al. 2008, Goldfinger et al. 2013). Only 
the occurrence of Ecatastrophic (a rare "super-
quake", or "uncharacteristic" earthquake, Kagan 
and Geller 2012) truly challenges the paradigm 
(it may be considered as a refutation in Popper's 
sense). An Inductive/Statistical model may 
safely  explain the normal case provided that a 
representative set of data (not too narrow in 
time and space) is used, but will explain the 
Lacassin R. & Lavelle S. - Revised Ms - Earth Science Reviews - January 2016          –         page 14
14 # Note that those seismic hazard maps does show the probability of occurrence of a given earthquake, 
but the probability of reaching a particular seismic intensity, or ground acceleration level, in the next 30 
years, at a given site inland. 
catastrophic event only after its occurrence, 
thus a posteriori. Forecasting a priori the most 
catastrophic case bears deep uncertainties and is 
likely impossible with a statistical model (Stein 
and Stein 2013). Yet, in a more deterministic 
way and with a paradigm shift, we may attempt 
to put more realistic bounds on the Maximum 
Credible Earthquake (MCE). However, the de-
terministic problem remains imperfect and 
partly empirical because we still lack for a deep 
understanding of the physical laws (Lnormal and 
more particularly Lcatastrophic).
Finally, the interpretation of the meth-
odological framework in the “T ō h o k u -
Fukushima” case raises the issue of the rela-
tionship  between the scientific production of 
facts and models and the values and the norms 
of research. In the logical approach to research 
(typical of the philosophical stream of logical 
positivism supporting the “scientific world con-
ception”), there is a clear divide inspired by the 
philosopher David Hume between the “Is” (de-
scription) and the “Ought” (prescription)15. This 
means for the field of research that it is one 
thing to determine what research “is” - the way 
it really functions, but it is another thing to de-
termine what research “ought” to be - the way it 
should ideally function. This basic “epistemic/
ethical” divide implies in its radical version that 
science is based on facts, while morals (not  sci-
ence) as a separate domain is based on values 
and norms16. The problem with the separatist 
view comes from its blindness to the actual 
value/norm-dependence of science that  Putnam 
as a critical heir to logical positivism referred to 
as “the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy” 
(Putnam 2002). To some extent, the epistemic 
and the ethical merge if one takes for granted 
that research not only is based on facts but also 
is ruled by some values and some norms (see 
Dalibor, 2010). However, it is not clear whether 
all values and norms are of the same kind, and 
for some philosophers, indeed, there are actu-
ally several options as to the relationship be-
tween the epistemic and the ethical (Haack, 
2001)17. 
One of the questions concerning the 
epistemic values and norms of science, as in-
stances of the “virtues of the mind” (Zagzebski 
1996), is to identify what is a virtue and what is 
an obligation. For instance, are the boldness of 
conjectures and the openness of mind a value or 
a norm - or in other words, a virtue or an obli-
gation? Is it legitimate to expect that the re-
Lacassin R. & Lavelle S. - Revised Ms - Earth Science Reviews - January 2016          –         page 15
15	
  David Hume (1739, 2011), p.333. 
16	
  It also shed some light on what makes the difference between Kuhn and Popper, namely the hiatus 
between a descriptive and a more prescriptive approach to research.
17 	
 Susan Haack, for instance, suggests that there are at least five possibilities in which epistemic and 
ethical appraisal might be related: (1) epistemic appraisal is a subspecies of ethical appraisal (the special-
case thesis); (2) positive/negative epistemic appraisal is distinct from, but invariably associated with, 
positive/negative ethical appraisal (correlation thesis); (3) there is, not invariable correlation, but partial 
overlap, where positive/negative epistemic appraisal is associated with positive/negative ethical appraisal 
(the overlap thesis); (4) ethical appraisal is inapplicable where epistemological appraisal is irrelevant (the 
independence thesis); (5) epistemic appraisal is distinct from, but analogous to, ethical appraisal (the analogy 
thesis).
searchers are ruled by the obligation of being 
bold and open, almost in the same way as they 
are asked to be rigorous and honest? Can this 
be an obligation or should it remain a mere in-
dividual or collective virtue of the researchers 
that some do possess while some other do not? 
It seems legitimate to enforce researchers to be 
rigorous and honest, but it seems less easy to 
enforce them to be bold and open. In that sense, 
being bold and open for a researcher can be 
viewed as a value and a virtue; but if it is a 
norm that is called to regulate the functioning 
of research, the question remains open if it 
should be an obligation. The problem is that 
one really wonders what such a norm can actu-
ally mean if in no way  it  is linked to an obliga-
tion that requests some real people to adjust or 
modify  their conduct. At least, it seems legiti-
mate as a minimal request to ask them as a 
community  not to ignore or not to prevent some 
of its members from being “bold” and “open” 
and to take them seriously when they  support 
alternative or deviant options18. This applies to 
the non-evidence-based research (conjectures) 
and all the more to the evidence-based one 
(facts), for, as suggested in critical rationalism, 
the boldness of conjectures or the openness of 
minds must prevail at the prior stage of conjec-
tures and not only at the posterior stage of tests. 
Perhaps the notion of responsibility  is 
likely to bridge the two sides of the epistemic 
and the ethical in a more satisfying way. The 
notion of epistemic responsibility tends to focus 
on the cognitive norms, obligations or duties 
that in some way warrant the justification of 
knowledge, i.e. the reasons why someone is jus-
tified in believing as true (or non-false) what he 
or she actually believes it is true (or non-false). 
However, beyond the stake of justification, it 
can also be conceived of, in respect to the usual 
meaning of the word “responsibility”, as the 
ability  to account for the quality  (completeness, 
rightness, soundness or robustness) of the re-
search work if asked to justify it by the rest of 
the community or the society. Then, the epis-
temic requirements seem to overlap with those 
involved by the notion of ethical responsibility 
insofar as they  set up the conditions for a moral 
assessment in terms of imputation of the con-
nections between knowledge, action and conse-
quences. To some extent, even if the two no-
tions do not merge completely, it seems that the 
epistemic responsibility of a research commu-
nity  covers a significant part of its ethical re-
sponsibility. The question is: what kinds of 
achievement or negligence researchers can be 
taken to be responsible for? 
There are some examples of double-
sided requests (epistemic and ethical), like in 
the Aquila’s earthquake, that put in question the 
quality of the scientific expertise and of its 
communication to the public 19. In that context, 
the rigour and honesty as well as the boldness 
and open-mindedness are not taken to be mere 
value-requirements but some genuine norm-
requirements. In other words, the rule of open 
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  We are aware of research proposals submitted after the Sumatra 2004 earthquake. The aim was to 
dive at the trench and search for sea-bottom ruptures. Rejection was based on circular arguments such as: it 
is useless to search for surface ruptures because it is well known that seismic ruptures never reach the front 
of the accretionary prism. Assumptions definitively disproved by the 2011 Japan earthquake.
19 	
 In the case of l'Aquila earthquake, in Italy, the light-weigh attitude of scientific experts and politi-
cians resulted in the communication of incorrect scientific statements to the public (Jordan, 2013) and the 
eventual dramatic misunderstanding of the risks by local population (see Hall 2011, Jordan 2013, Yeo 2014 
for example)
criticism functions as a basic norm of research 
while dogmatism in excess (and even scepti-
cism in excess to some extent) appears as a 
transgression of this norm that the research 
community  can be asked to account for. Of 
course, this epistemic/ethical responsibility  of 
research, like for any form or any domain of 
responsibility, faces some limits: “Ought” im-
plies “Can”, the German philosopher Kant used 
to say, thus suggesting that  one cannot require 
from someone that he or she achieve something 
that is impossible (like for example short term 
prediction of earthquakes). There is something 
new under the Sun, however: the research 
community  is not the only  one to determine 
what those limits of responsibility are, or 
should be, for the society is also concerned with 
the quality  of its work. In this regard, if the co-
production of knowledge (experts/citizens) is 
already a quite well-identified social trend, the 
possibility of a “methodological co-design” that 
would take into account the stake of epistemic 
and ethical responsibility is possibly one of the 
major issues for the philosophy of research in 
the future.  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
	
 Our geophysical review and methodo-
logical analysis help identify interwoven causes 
to the scientific and technical failure that even-
tually lead to faulty implementation of coastal 
protection measures and to the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster. Even though we may 
identify a full chain of responsibilities involv-
ing technical and political stakeholders, we may 
also point to a mistake on the scientific side. 
Indeed, scientists were unable to forecast a pri-
ori mega-earthquakes - and sometimes much 
more able to explain them a posteriori. Yet, 
many signals indicated that an earthquake of 
this magnitude offshore northeast Japan was 
possible, although the time of occurrence of 
such event was impossible to predict precisely. 
The origin of this scientific mistake with seri-
ous human consequences lies in several factors 
that challenge a dominant paradigm of seismol-
ogy. Thus, the scientific community was long 
gained in its majority in a paradigm, in Thomas 
Kuhn’s sense. Hazard evaluation in Japan was 
chiefly based on the concept of repetition of 
characteristic earthquakes, defined only from 
the short-term earthquake record; but what hap-
pened in 2011 was definitively an "uncharacter-
istic" earthquake (see Kagan and Geller, 2012). 
The Great East Japan Earthquake - as it is often 
referred in Japan - indeed crystallized the crisis 
of that paradigm: it's now “shake-up time for 
Japanese seismology” says R. Geller in Nature 
(Geller, 2011) partly using the title of an older 
Nature's paper about characteristic earthquakes 
and prediction issues (Geller 1991). We sum-
marize on Figure 4, the main events that lead to 
the crisis. In line with some other authors (e.g. 
McCaffrey 2008), we favour the interpretation 
that most of the Mw>8.5 events that occurred 
years and decades before the Tōhoku earth-
quake could actually be taken as refutations of 
the established model. However the paradigm 
crisis became clear only after the Tōhoku-
Fukushima disaster and the need for a paradigm 
shift is now well identified (see Avouac 2011, 
Stein et al. 2012, Geller et al. 2015, Hubbard et 
al. 2015, among many others).
	
 The methodological confrontation be-
tween the logical-critical interpretation and the 
pragmatic interpretation can emphasize the im-
portance of certain standards and conflict of 
standards in the dynamics of research. In this 
respect, it is clear that the imagination, bold-
ness and openness as well as the ability to 
doubt and consider uncertainties appear for re-
search as a set of core values (if not norms) that 
may function as both epistemic and ethical 
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standards and be viewed as so essential as rigor 
and precision. Our interpretation is that blind-
ness rather than openness was predominant in 
the analytical tropism (an Inductive/Statistical 
approach, too narrow in time and space) that led 
to biased hazard evaluation in Japan. We can 
postulate the same tropism to be inherent to 
nearly all probabilistic seismic hazard analyses 
(PSHA), which are generally based on limited 
datasets and unable to evaluate properly the 
maximum credible event (MCE)  20.  This im-
plies that the worst-case scenario (Sunstein 
2009) is in general not taken into account by 
such analyses, as it happened for NE Japan21. 
	
 When forecasting rare extreme natural 
events with potential catastrophic effects – and 
more specifically for extremely sensible indus-
trial plants – a deterministic MCE evaluation 
may set up a much safer framework than 
PSHA, provided it is done with openness, con-
sidering all options and not only the laws com-
patible with the most consensual paradigm. 
This urges scientists and engineers to be aware 
not only of the consensus but also of the dissen-
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20 	
 Refer for example to Klügel (2008) for a critical review of methods used in seismic hazard analysis, 
to Castaños and Lomnitz (2002), Stein and Stein (2013) and Stein and Friedrich (2014) for a discussion on 
epistemic limitations of such methods.
21 # We must acknowledge here that the Tōhoku case was worse than what occurs elsewhere in Japan 
because the discrepancy between the characteristic earthquakes used for hazard evaluation and what really 
occurred was extremely large. Indeed, in central Japan closer to former imperial capitals, a better known 
seismic history makes the risk of several Mw8+ along the Nankai trough (corresponding to ruptures of the 
Nankai, Tokai, Tonankai megathrust segments) clearly identified since a long time (e.g., Ando 1975). A com-
plete rupture of the three segments altogether was even envisaged, based on what likely occurred in 1707. 
The paradigm shift required after the Tōhoku disaster not only suggests that this catastrophic case is fully 
credible but that it perhaps represents only a minimum for the maximum credible earthquake (MCE) on the 
Nankai trough.
Figure 4 : Timeline of main subduction earthquakes since beginning of the 20th century. Megathrust earthquakes 
appear to have been clustered in time. Note that the 1950-60s cluster occurred before of during formalization of the 
unifying plate tectonic model. The subduction earthquake paradigm (see text) grew during the ~40yrs period that 
follows and lacks Mw≥8.5 megathrust earthquakes. However, the observation since 1970 that inland thrust earth-
quakes do frequently reach the surface, as well as the occurrence of the giant seismic rupture offshore Sumatra in 
2004, should have been taken as possible refutations of that paradigm. But its crisis became tangible only after the 
sus within their research community. And to 
promote real democratic and open debate and 
choices, they have the responsibility to com-
municate and properly explain all uncertainties 
and unknowns to the technical and political 
sphere as well as to the rest of the Society22. 
That could be one methodological lesson drawn 
by the research community from a paradigm 
crisis as an outcome of the Tōhoku-Fukushima 
catastrophe. 
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22# Following Stein and Friedrich (2014),"we should try to better assess hazards, recognizing and un-
derstanding the uncertainties involved, and communicate these uncertainties to the public and planners for-
mulating mitigation policies."
	
 Similarly, as a conclusion of an opinion paper in Seismological Research Letter, Geller et al. (2013) 
point up that: "In discussing natural hazards it is important to tell the public not only what we know, but also 
what we do not know, and how uncertain our knowledge is." They insist that "It’s time to change the terms of 
the debate from the oversimplified “safe/unsafe” dichotomy to an honest and open discussion of what the 
risks are and what is being done to mitigate them [...] At the end of the discussion, the public and the leaders 
they have elected, rather than technical experts, should make the final call."
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